We present and test a formal framework for expressing the idea that taking account of the multiple meanings conveyed by natural language may help economists to better understand the impact of pre-play free-form communication. We model coordination games where each player simultaneously requests others to take a particular action. We assume requests include two independent features: the desired action as well as the request's "attitude". We show that, in relation to one-dimensional signals, communication with attitude increases the rate of coordination on actions. We test our model both in Shanghai and Washington D.C. using laboratory implementations of complete information coordination games with pre-play communication. Consistent with our model, we find (i) natural language action requests are made with attitude; (ii) people consider both the requested action and attitude when making action decisions; and (iii) the use of attitude improves coordination. We also find evidence of gender differences. Although males and females recognize and respond to attitude equally well, females are more likely to send more demanding action recommendations than males, while males generally focus more on which action request to send rather than which attitude to use. Our results imply that, when requesting actions of another, it is important to be clear not only about the action but also the attitude with which the request is made. Knowing that transparent attitude can improve economic outcomes can benefit conversational and social media strategies in any social, economic or political environment.
INTRODUCTION
Economic experiments allowing subjects to communicate using natural language have also appeared (e.g. Ledyard 1995) . Natural language communication has been shown to improve efficiency in games including prisoners' dilemmas (Dawes, MacTavish, and Shaklee 1977) , sealed bid auctions (Isaac and Walker 1985) , as well as games of signaling (Cooper and Kagel 2005) and coordination (Brandts and Cooper 2007) . A relatively early contribution was Ledyard (1995) , which compared face-to-face communication, verbal communication through chat room and numerical cheap talk through computer terminals in public provisions environment, and found while face-to-face and verbal communication both have equally strong effect on increasing contributions, numerical cheap communication had no effect.
Many studies implement pre-play cheap-talk as free-form written messages (e.g. Cooper and Kagel 2005; Xiao and Houser 2005 , 2011 Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Brandts and Cooper 2007; Schotter and Sopher 2007; Kimbrough et al. 2008; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2007; Sutter and Strassmair 2009; Heinnig Schmidt et al. 2008; Lundquist et al. 2009 , Cason et al. 2012 . Some studies also use face-to-face communication (Isaac, Ramey and Williams 1984; Daughety and Forsythe 1987a, 1987b; Binger et al. 1990; Valley et al. 1998) .
In broad brush-stroke, the message of the empirical literature is that the efficiency of economic outcomes is surprisingly high in the presence of pre-play communication, and all the more so when communication includes natural language. As pointed out by Ledyard (1995, p. 158 ) the question left unanswered is: why? Our paper, building on economic theory that points to the importance of richly-structured multi-meaning free-form messages, is a step towards answering this question.
MODEL
Our model incorporates commonly known language into two-stage games in which players simultaneously communicate in the first stage C and simultaneously take actions in the second stage G. We denote this two-stage game as G* (C, G). All players i= 1, …, k make decisions in both stages.
Beginning with the second (or action) stage, players play a complete information game G. Each player i takes an action ∈ , where each players action set , i= 1, …, k, is finite. We denote as the set containing all Nash equilibrium of G. We focus on coordination games, where multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria exist. Suppose a subset Ԑ ∈ includes at least two elements , ′ ( , , ′ , ′′ , … ) which Pareto-dominate all other elements (if any) in , while at the same time no element in Ԑ Pareto-dominates the other(s). This payoff structure ensures any improvement from communication is sustained. The set of all the strategies
Player i can play is denoted by . Let ( , − ) ∈ × − be the strategies that constitute equilibrium ∈ Ԑ. Let ( , − ) and − ( , − ) denote players' strategy-dependent payoffs.
Turning now to the first (or communication) stage, each player sends a message simultaneously from a publicly known set M. Messages are cheap-talk in that they are neither binding nor costly. Consequently, behavioral assumptions must underlie claims about the effects of pre-game communication on expectations.
In day-to-day life, people use different words and have different ways to construct sentences. As a result, natural language is not a limited space. For this reason the impact of freeform communication can be challenging to model. We circumvent this by assuming that the set of action-relevant information conveyed by natural-language messages is finite. We make this idea precise by defining a common and complete language space in the next subsection.
Language Space
In the spirit of Rabin (1994) , we assume players share a common language M. A common language consists of (1) a meaningful vocabulary; (2) a shared understanding among players that it is appropriate to interpret statements according to their literal meaning. Common language is important not only because it eliminates the inessential multiplicity of equilibria in cheap-talk games, but also it restricts the plausible interpretations of out-of-equilibrium messages, which could otherwise be anything needed to support equilibrium 1 .
First, we define the E-meaning and A-meaning (attitude) of messages.
DEFINITION 1.
The E-meaning of a message refers to the equilibrium that the message suggests. We denote the set of messages that suggest equilibrium E as ( ).
DEFINITION 2. The A-meaning of a message indicates how strongly players indicate their preference to achieve a certain equilibrium. We denote set of messages conveying attitude D as ( ).
Attitude (A-meaning) is a linear ordering of the strength of preference to achieve a certain equilibrium. Since players communicate in a common language space, we assume that all players express and interpret attitude with the same linear ordering. For example, we assume that everyone in the game should agree that a message like "I choose X no matter what" expresses a stronger preference than a message like "It's up to you, if you have no strong opinion, let's choose X", even though they have the same E-meaning.
Next, extending Rabin (1991 Rabin ( , 1994 , we define a complete language space 2 both in Emeaning and A-meaning.
1 See Crawford (1998) for more details. 2 Rabin (1991 Rabin ( , 1994 ) defines a complete and common space for the E-meaning of language.
DEFINITION 3. The E-meaning of language M is complete with respect to game G iff:
(1) For all ∈ , there exists an equilibrium E ∈ of G such that ∈ ( );
(2) For every two equilibria ∈ , ′ ∈ and ≠ ′ of G, ( ) ∩ ( ′ ) = ∅.
DEFINITION 4.
The A-meaning of language M is complete with respect to game G iff (1) For all ∈ , there exists attitude ∈ such that ∈ ( );
Definition 3 assumes all messages suggest some equilibrium, and that no message can simultaneously request to play two different equilibria. Analogously, Definition 4 assumes that every message conveys an A-meaning, and that no single message can convey more than one attitude.
3.2. Equilibria 3.2.1. Agreement Equilibrium We now discuss how players form an "agreement" in this language space. Rabin (1991 Rabin ( , 1994 defines players to have an "agreement" when they mention the same equilibrium in the pre-played communication stage. Proposition 1 and Definition 5 in this subsection extend the notion of "agreement" into a communication environment where both E-meaning and A-meaning of messages exist, and then proceeds to define the concept of an agreement equilibrium.
ASSUMPTION 1 (CREDIBILITY) If it is optimal for any player to honor the E-meaning of her message when all other players honor the E-meaning of their messages, then all players' messages' E-meanings will be honored.
This assumption extends the idea of credibility 3 to a n-way communication environment.
Because talk is cheap it should not matter, in the sense that any first-stage communication followed by second-stage Nash play in G is an equilibrium of the extended game G*. Nevertheless, communication can improve coordination under certain conditions, which makes credibility important. In particular, Assumption 1 implies that when all players send messages with the same E-meaning, the players will coordinate and play that equilibrium in G.
PROPOSITION 1.
For each Nash Equilibrium ∈ Ԑ, players play E if players make proposal set = ( 1 , … , ), where ∈ ( ) ∀ ∈ (1, … , ). If all the players suggest the same equilibrium in the first stage C, by the Credibility condition, they have an implicit agreement to play that equilibrium.
(1) Players make proposal set = ( 1 , … , ) in stage C, where To ignore a message means to treat it as if it had never been expressed. Assumption 2 means players are able to use A-meaning to resolve the conflicts between E-meanings. Based on this assumption, we can deduce how a simultaneous "negotiated agreement" can occur within one round of simultaneous multi-way communication. When multiple players' messages all convey the same A-meaning, then neither Assumption 1 nor Assumption 2 hold, so that players are unable to base their play in G on the sent messages. Further, if all players choose to honor the E-meanings of their own messages, then coordination necessarily fails. With Assumption 3, the coordination rate with communication is assured to be at least as high as when there is no pre-play communication. Note that given Assumption 3, communication-failure does not necessarily result in coordination failure. The reason is players may coordinate without communication.
In these equilibria subsection we illustrate the possible equilibria players can achieve in this two-stage game. Players are guaranteed to achieve payoffs at least as high as when there is no communication as long as all of them respond to each communication situation based the model in previous subsection. However, one presumably wants to avoid Pareto-dominated outcomes that result from communication failure. This can be done by optimally use E-meaning and Ameaning of messages based on beliefs over the distribution of message types. For ease of exposition, and consistent with the game we study below, in the following we focus on twoperson games. It is straightforward to generalize the model to a k-player environment.
Communication Strategies
PROPOSITION 3. Given any beliefs about the distribution of E-meanings and A-meanings expected to be received from counterparts' messages, players maximize their expected utility by sending messages that include the E-meaning they are most likely to receive, and the A-meaning they are least likely to receive.
Proof. Denote as the belief player i has about counterpart j sending ∈ ( ), ∀ ∈ Ԑ, and is the belief of counterpart sending ∈ ( ), ∀ ∈ . 
Modified Holm (2000) Pink-Blue Game
Our interest is in determining whether people use and respond to natural language messages in a way that is consistent with the model above. To do this, following Holm (2000) 4 , we design a "Pink-Blue" Game, where options are labeled as Pink and Blue, and counterparts' genders are revealed to players at beginning. We use an announcement to ensure it common knowledge that, for the purpose of this game, "pink is a color preferred by females, and blue is a color preferred by males". To the Holm (2000) environment we added a pre-play free-form communication stage C, where players are able to send each other simultaneous messages. After the message exchange, players make decisions in the Pink-Blue game, the payoff matrix for which is described by (Fig.1) . As indicated by the Figure, players earn x>0 if they choose the same color, and zero otherwise.
The Pink-Blue game has three Nash equilibria: two pure-strategy equilibria (PINK, PINK), (BLUE, BLUE) as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium where each player plays each action with probability 0.5. Neither pure-strategy equilibria Pareto-dominates the other, but both dominate the mixed strategy equilibrium. Given that Pink-Blue is a complete information game, players can use pre-play communication exclusively to make claims about intended moves (as compared to, for example, using this stage to reveal private information 5 ).
Next, we map the Pink-Blue game to the framework described above. We begin by specifying the language space Ԑ={B, P} and = { , } where > .
HYPOTHESIS 1.
Players communicate with one of four types of messages in game G*(C, G): Demanding Blue (DmB), Demanding Pink (DmP), Deferring Blue (DfB), Deferring Pink (DfP).
i.e. m ∈ = { , , , }.
DmB refers to the case where the sender intended to play BLUE, and requests the other player also play BLUE; DfB refers to the case where the sender intended play BLUE, but is ultimately deferring the choice to the player, and analogously for DmP and DfP. Hypothesis 1 is built on Definition 1-4. It states that players in Pink-blue Game communicate in this well-defined common and complete space with both E-meaning and A-meaning.
Equilibria of Pink-Blue
Based on Assumption 1-3 and Definition 5-7, we obtain following three hypotheses and summarized all connections between messages and actions in Fig. 2 . When two players suggest the same color, they can achieve an agreement equilibrium. When two players suggest different colors with different attitudes, they achieve a negotiated equilibrium. Communication failure occurs when the two players suggest different colors with same Attitude. In this case, they ignore the messages and play a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. ), (
HYPOTHESIS 2. If paired players send messages
3.4.2. Communication Strategies in the Pink-Blue game In the previous subsection we built a matrix (Fig.2) to illustrate links between all 16 possible paired communication situations and response actions. In Pink-Blue game, a pair of players is guaranteed to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium in the second stage as long as both of them respond to each communication situation in first stage based the model in previous subsection. However, one presumably wants to avoid Pareto-dominated outcomes that result from communication failure. This can be done by optimally use E-meaning and A-meaning of messages based on beliefs over the distribution of message types. Hypothesis 5 is implied directly from Corollary 1, while Hypothesis 6 is derived from Proposition 3. (Blue, Blue) in the second stage game, players will send messages with Blue E-meaning, and with a focal point of (Pink, Pink) 
HYPOTHSIS 5. With a focal point of

EXPERIMENTAL TEST
We conduct the Pink-Blue game both without (baseline treatment) and with (communication treatment) two-way simultaneous free-form communication. The game proceeds as follows. We begin by randomly assigning people to pairs. We then reveal the gender of each person in each pair to both players. In the communication treatment, there is then simultaneous pre-play free-form communication (they send a written message to each other). Finally, the players simultaneously choose a color. If they choose the same color, then both earn the same amount of money in addition to their show-up payment. Otherwise, both earn only the show-up amount.
To avoid menu effects (i.e. the possibility that participants will coordinate on the first listed option), we use a presentation without focal points. In particular, we use a square payoff figure  (Fig. 3 ) that ensures no option is more salient than any other.
FIGURE 3. Instruction Table
To ensure color-labels were treated the same way across sessions and cultures, in all instructions subjects were informed: "Pink is a color preferred by females, and blue is a color preferred by males".
Baseline Treatment
In the baseline, subjects are randomly paired with anonymous counterparts and provided with information of each other's gender. Then each subject chooses a color-label option simultaneously.
Communication Treatment
The treatment with communication proceeds just as in baseline, with the exception that subjects are able to write any message they like to each other simultaneously. Messages are written and delivered after the gender of the counterpart has been revealed and prior to subjects' Pink/Blue choices. In each round, each player has one chance to write a note to her counterpart. They are not able to read the counterparts' notes until they have finished writing their own messages.
Procedures
We use a between-subject design. That is, each subject experiences exactly one treatment, either with communication or without communication. In both treatments, each subject plays three rounds of the same game and faces different counterparts each round. At the beginning of each round, subjects are randomly and anonymously paired. The randomization was not constrained by gender, though nearly all subjects experienced games with both genders. At the end of the experiment, one of the three rounds was randomly selected to determine subjects' payoffs.
During the experiment players were seated at separated computer terminals and were given a copy of the experiment's instructions. These instructions were also read aloud, as we wanted to ensure subjects understood that the information contained in them is common knowledge. The experiment was conducted at George Mason University, Washington, D.C., and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai. Subjects interacted only with people from their same university. At Mason, subjects were paid $5 for showing up and $10 for coordination success. At SJTU, subjects were paid 10 RMB for showing up and 40 RMB for coordination success (1 US dollar ≈ 6.14 RMB and 1 US dollar ≈ 6.06 RMB when we conducted the experiment in Shanghai, May 2013 and Dec. 2013) The experiment lasted about 40 minutes and the average payoff was designed to be slightly above the local hourly wage for subjects from the two subject pools.
RESUTLS
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate populations at George Mason University (GMU) and Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU). Each of the 228 participations made 3 decisions, for a total of 684 observations. Table 1 summarizes our subjects' demographics. -19th, 2013 There are few things need to be mentioned about our subjects pool. First, both subject pools include more males than females; the gender ratio of SJTU is more unbalanced than GMU. This reflects the unbalanced gender ratio in SJTU, which is probably due to that SJTU is an engineering University. Second, Seventy-eight percent of participants at GMU were born in United States, and all of the SJTU participants were born in China. Finally, the age and GPA of GMU and SJTU are comparable to each other.
Baseline
In the absence of communication, as discussed in Holm (2000) , if both players are females, (Pink, Pink) is focal, while if both are males (Blue, Blue) is focal. In a mixed-gender group, they would coordinate on Pink if both male and female consider females' color preference should be more respected, coordinate on Blue if both male and female consider males' color preference should be more respected, and coordinate on the mixed strategy (1/2, 1/2) if there is no clear social pressure regarding this matter. Table 2 and Fig. 4 illustrate the empirical results we collected from baseline treatment. Ninety-seven percent of GMU players in male-male groups choose blue and the coordination rate is as high as 93%. In SJTU, players in the male-male group coordinated on blue with 100% probability. About 11% of GMU female players choose blue and coordination success is 78%, no female player in SJTU choose blue and coordination success is 100%. As noted, with mixed-gender groups, players may simply mix (effectively ignoring gender information), or they may adopt strategies that depend on gender-based expectations, possibly influenced by a shared sense of social pressure to choose in favor of one gender or another. Regardless, one expects it would be more difficult to coordinate in mixed-than single-gender groups.
RESULT 1b. Mixed-gender groups coordinated less well than same-gendered groups.
When facing a counterpart of the opposite gender, 73% of females and 64% of males in Shanghai chose pink. Mixed-gender groups in Shanghai achieved 73% rate of coordination success. While in Washington, D.C., 46% of the females and 41% of the males chose pink. The coordination rate of mixed-gender groups in D.C. is about 59%. Apparently, mixed-gender groups coordinated less well than same-gendered groups (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test: z = -4.956, P<0.001, two-sided test, 1 = 44, 2 = 56 6 ) Furthermore, the coordination rate of mixedgender groups in Shanghai is not higher than D.C. (WMW test: z=0.783, P=0.434, two-sided test, 1 = 22, 2 = 43). However we can see from Fig. 4 , that both Shanghai males and females tend to choose pink more often. In D.C., it seems people are playing a mixed-strategy between pink and blue.
Communication and Coordination
RESULT 2. Communication significantly improved coordination rates in both subject pools.
Here we compare the coordination rates between the baseline treatment where there is no communication and the communication treatment where paired subjects can send two-way simultaneous free-form messages to each other. The coordination rate is significantly increased under communication (WMW test: z = -4.271, P<0.001, two-sided test, 1 = 100, 2 = 128). This result holds if we test the hypothesis respectively in the two subject pools (WMW test: z = -4.173, P<0.001, two-sided test, 1 = 42, 2 = 52 in GMU; z = -1.707, P=0.088, two-sided test, 1 = 58, 2 = 76 in SJTU). However, while the coordination rate is increased significantly in mixed-gender groups (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test: z = -4.796, P<0.001, two-sided test, 1 = 56, 2 = 66), the change in same-gender groups is insignificant (WMW test: z =1.197, P=0.23, two-sided test, 1 = 44, 2 = 62). The reason, of course, is that coordination rates are already very high in same-gender groups in the baseline treatment.
Next we investigate reasons for communication's success in promoting coordination. In particular, we are interested in discovering whether our participants both use and respond to messages that include both E-meaning and A-meaning.
Nature of Communication
In order to analyze the content of messages objectively, we use the Houser and Xiao (2011) 7 procedure to classify our messages. We recruit 32 evaluators from SJTU and 37 from GMU to categorize the messages written by our subjects. All the messages are translated into both Chinese and English and classified by these third party evaluators from both pools. Evaluators read messages and place them into five categories: "Demanding Pink", "Deferring Pink", "Demanding Blue", "Deferring Blue" and "None of Above". In the instructions, they were told: "you should choose 'Demanding Pink' if you believe the message writer suggests pink, and requests that her or his counterpart also chooses Pink. You should choose 'Deferring Pink' if you believe the message writer suggests Pink, but is ultimately deferring the choice to her or his counterpart." Similarly for "Demanding Blue" and "Deferring Blue". Evaluators are paid based on whether their categorizations of three random chosen messages are consistent with most popular categorizations for that session.
7 While some previous literature on communication uses research assistants as evaluators, Houser and Xiao (2011) discuss the advantage of using a coordination game classify message content. This classification method is increasingly used to classify messages from free-form communication studies (e.g. Xiao and Houser, 2005; Gachter et al. 2013; Deck et al. 2013; Ong et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2013) We classify a message as one of the four categories in our model only if more than 50% of the evaluators from both pools place it in that same category. We classify a message as "None of Above" if either more than half of evaluators from both pools believe it belongs to "None of above", or fewer than 50% of evaluators agree on any of the four named categories.
RESULT 3. 95.83% of cases players are classified consistently by evaluators from the U.S. and China as communicating with one of the four types of messages: Demanding Blue, Deferring
Blue, Demanding Pink or Deferring Pink. Fig.6 shows the distribution of classifications among all the messages we collected from the two subjects pools. Among the 384 messages collected, only ten messages were categorized differently between Shanghai subjects and D.C. subjects, and only six messages were not classified within one of the four named classifications. Thus, 95.83% of messages were classified consistently by evaluators from both pools as one of the four named communication types. Result 3 is a direct test of Hypothesis 1.
It is important to emphasize that messages were classified based on message content only. Evaluators were provided no other information. In particular, evaluators did not know which messages were paired and knew neither the gender nor the choices of the message writers. Because evaluations are independent of participants' choices, we are able to use the classified Emeanings and A-meanings to test whether people wrote and responded to messages as our theory predicts.
Responses to Messages
In this subsection, we focus our attention on cases where both messages from a pair of players are classified as one of the four named types. We do this as a direct test of our model. 
GMU SJTU
Result 4 confirms the validity of Hypothesis 2. Overall, in 99.6% of cases players chose to honor their messages when both players suggested the same pure-strategy equilibrium. As a result, players achieved agreement-equilibrium in 99.2% of the cases. As shown in Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b Hypothesis 3 describes how players can take advantage of A-meanings (attitudes) to resolve conflicts between E-meanings in Pink-Blue game. From this, we can infer how a "negotiated equilibrium" can emerge within a single round of simultaneous two-way communication. It requires that when there is one demanding and one deferring A-meaning from paired players, the demanding announcement will be honored, while the deferring announcement will be ignored.
Empirically, pooled across locations, in 95.7% of 232 cases demanding players chose to honor their words and 100% of deferring players switched to demanding players' announced option. As a result players reached negotiated-equilibrium in 95.7% of the cases where it was possible. This is strong evidence people do take advantage of and respond to the A-meaning of language. As depicted in Fig.7 The result states that, consistent with Hypothesis 4, communication failed in those cases where paired players' messages included different E-meanings and the same A-meaning. In only 53.2% of these cases our subjects chose to honor the color in their messages. Specifically, the overall coordination rate was still as high as 87.1% because they find other ways to coordinate just as the case when there is no communication.
As is shown in Fig. 7 , the fraction of people who chose to honor their words when paired players requested different colors with same attitude is around 50%, and this number is consistent across cultures (WMW test: z=-0.602, P=5474, two-sided test, 1 =27, 2 =22) and gender (WMW test: z=704, P=481, two-sided test, 1 =25, 2 =24).
RESULT 7. When the conditions of agreement equilibrium or negotiated equilibrium are achieved in the first stage, coordination success in the second stage is significantly higher than otherwise.
Given that conditions of which equilibrium players have reached after the first stage is a result of their own communication style as well as their counterpart's communication style rather than a randomly assigned independent variable, we should not perform non-parametric tests. To accommodate the non-independence issue with respect to individuals, we ran OLS econometric models which control for random effects at individual level. The dependent variable in the model is coordination success, which takes value of 1 if two matched players choose the same option, while takes a value of zero otherwise. The independent variables included in the regressions are: negotiated equilibrium condition dummy, which takes value of 1 if the subjects have achieved the conditions for negotiated equilibrium in the first stage, and 0 otherwise; communicationfailure condition dummy, which takes value of 1 if subjects face the condition of communication failure in the first stage, and 0 otherwise; Culture dummy, which takes a value of one for GMU subjects, and 0 for SJTU subjects; Gender dummy, which takes a value of 1 for male subjects, and 0 for female subjects; Gender of counterpart dummy, which is equal to 1 for the subjects who interact with male counterparts in the round, and 0 for the subjects who interact with female counterparts; age, year of staying the current location, GPA, and relationship status, which takes a value of 1 if subjects are committed in a relationship, takes a value of 2 if subjects has a relationship but not committed to it, takes a value of 3 if single.
Model 1 of Table 3 includes data from both males and females and both locations. The first regression shows that the coordination rate under baseline of agreement equilibrium condition, after controlled for culture, gender, gender of counterpart, age, year of staying current location, GPA, relationship status, the coordination rate is significantly lower in communication failure cases, while not significantly different in negotiated equilibrium cases.
Model 2-4 pairwise compare when conditions of different Equilibria are achieved. Model 2 only includes data from cases when the conditions of either agreement equilibrium or negotiated equilibrium have been achieved. Model 3 only includes data from cases when the conditions of either agreement equilibrium or communication-failure equilibrium have been achieved. Model 4 only includes data of cases when the conditions of either negotiated equilibrium or communication-failure equilibrium have been achieved. These regressions show that (i) the coordination rate in cases when agreement equilibrium conditions have been achieved is higher than when negotiated equilibrium conditions have been achieved; (ii) the coordination rate in cases when either agreement equilibrium conditions or negotiated conditions have been achieved is significantly higher than when communicationfailure conditions have been achieved. Table 4 shows five OLS regressions all of which control for random effects at the individual level. The dependent variable is coordination success, which takes value of 1 if two matched players choose the same option, and is zero otherwise. In addition to the controls included in Table 3 , we also include an E-meaning dummy, taking value of 1 (0) if a player requests Blue (Pink), and an A-meaning dummy taking value 1 (0) if a player is demanding (deferring).
As model 1 of Table 3 shows, when all messages 10 are included, both the E-meaning and Ameaning (attitude) impact coordination rates significantly after controlling for culture, gender, gender of counterpart, age, year, GPA, and relationship status. Generally speaking, both sending messages with Pink E-meaning and communicating with a demanding attitude increase the chance of coordination success. For males (Model 2), only E-meaning has an effect, while for females (Model 3), only A-meaning has an effect. With mixed-gender pairs (Model 4 for males, Model 5 for females), only Demanding messages from females seem to improve coordination. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are shown in parentheses. All models include a random effects, with individual subject effects.
The above analyses are at the level of the message. Next we investigate the communication strategies which players use at the individual level. We find some subjects always to send the same style of message regardless the gender of the counterpart, while the others vary the Emeaning or A-meaning according to their counterpart's gender. To provide formal evidence on this we adopt a statistical classification procedure proposed by El-gamal and Grether(1995) to classify each player's behavioral type as a sender. We assume that players in the game include exclusively behavioral types chosen randomly from separate distributions, each assigning positive prior probability to four "dogmatic" types, as well as to a sophisticated type 11 .
Specifically, we restrict attention to following types of players: 11 Crawford (2003) assumed players' roles in a sender-receiver game is filled by players chosen randomly from four possible mortal types (boundedly rational types), as well as to a sophisticated type. 12 Given our experiment design, we assume that(Blue, Blue) is focal if two male subjects are matched, while (Pink, Pink) is focal if two female subjects are matched, and there is no focal point for mixed-gender matches. Following El-Gamal and Grether (1995), we assume different subjects may use different rules and the error rate is same for all subjects and for all tasks. We introduce the possibility that subjects make errors with probability . This allows each of our decision rules to give a positive probability (likelihood) to all possible patterns of behavior.
RESULT 10. Males are more likely be dogmatic senders who always send Blue messages; while Females are more likely to be dogmatic senders who always send demanding messages. Fig. 9 summarizes our basic results of classification of senders' behavioral type by adopting El-gamal and Grether (1995) method. While 46% of male players are either dogmatic DmB senders or DfB senders, only 14% of male players are dogmatic senders who always send PINK. Such a color pattern is not observed among female dogmatic senders. However, 52% of females are dogmatic demanding senders while only 19% of females are dogmatic deferring senders. And attitude pattern is not observed among male dogmatic players.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a way to model rich, multi-meaning natural language communication with E-meanings and A-meanings (attitudes). In theory, the A-meaning of messages increases the chance of coordination when the E-meaning of messages don't match. This model allows us to answer two questions relevant to a well-structured language space: will people send rich messages that include multiple meanings, and will people respond as theory predicts to those multiple meanings?
As a step towards answering these question we conducted laboratory experiments at George Mason University, Washington DC and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai. We find that people write messages including both E-meaning and A-meaning (attitude), and that people respond to both of these meanings when they make decisions and in a way that is broadly consistent with theory.
Talk is the game that almost everyone plays everyday. In majority of those games, talk is "cheap-talk". That is, we cannot attach credible threat, promises or cost to it. People choose how to structure communication for a specific problem within the constraints of incentives. The study of cheap talk is based on how people skeptically, but reasonably and most conventionally interpret language. Fundamentally, we argue that economists may want to construct environment specific language space in order to understand how people communicate in an ordinary way. But we face the tradeoff of how limited we want the analytical language space to be. Being specific about every possible vocabulary, the analysis will lose generalizability and feasibility; while being too broad and ignoring the details, we might forfeit precious opportunities to fully understand why economic results were changed so much by cheap-talk. We also encounter the challenge that the interpretation of free-form communication is subjective, which can be solved by taking advantage of double-blind third party evaluators. This article is a small step towards that type of investigation. Further studies of free-form communication would be profitable.
